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COMPENSATION OF COUNSEL
damages to "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
Purex's complaint alleges that Procter-Clorox "engaged and con-
tinued to engage in severe and sustained predatory price cutting."6 2
Implicit within Purex's claim for relief is the requirement that there
be actual post-merger injury. However, neither the Court nor the
Commission found that Procter had actually engaged in any definite
anticompetitive behavior. Had there been any such behavior it
seems highly unlikely that the Commission would have failed to
use it against the merger, if only because an analysis based upon the
actual manifestation of predatory pricing would have been far
simpler. Therefore, it will be interesting to see to what extent, if
any, the Commission might have considerably simplified their task
by the use of such evidence.
K. G. ROBINsON, JR.
Attorney and Client-Compensation of Indigent's Counsel in
Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently held that coun-
sel appointed to defend an indigent defendant in the courts of North
Carolina cannot be compensated by the state for work done in the
federal courts to vacate the state conviction.1 The attorneys re-
and not just liquid bleach. Observe that section 5(b) of the Clayton Act
suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the pendency of
government proceedings and for one year thereafter.
02 Id.
State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 153 S.E.2d 749 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 828 (1967). The attorneys were appointed in Mecklenburg County
Superior Court in 1959 to defend Elmer Davis, Jr. who was charged with
rape and murder under ch. 112 (1949) N.C. SESs. L. (required counsel
for indigents charged with a capital offense). The conviction was appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court which affirmed, State v. Davis, 253
N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960). After a petition for rehearing was denied,
the attorneys won a stay of execution and sought certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court which was denied, Davis v. North Carolina, 365 U.S.
855 (1961). Attorneys then petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus which was denied, Davis v. North Carolina, 196 F.
Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961). On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
Davis' confession was obtained within the bounds of due process, Davis v.
North Carolina, 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962). The district court again
refused to grant the writ, Davis v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.
N.C. 1963) and the court of appeals upheld the lower court in a 3-2 decision,
Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966),
1968]
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ceived 1,700 dollars from Mecklenburg County for the work done in
the courts of North Carolina2 and sought an additional 1,758.72
dollars for expenses and 30,000 dollars as the reasonable value of
their services in the federal courts.' The lower court ordered the
state to pay the attorneys 8,000 dollars pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-5 (1965).' The court stated that failure to compensate these
attorneys would be a denial of due process and equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and
would deprive the attorneys of their "rights" under the Constitution
of North Carolina.5
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the lower court. It held that section 15-5 did not apply to
the facts presented and it was error to allow compensation in this
case.6 "The power to provide compensation for lawyers representing
indigent defendants rests with the Legislature and not the courts." 7
It appears that the Supreme Court of North Carolina is the only
appellate court to have passed on the question of whether a state
should pay a lawyer who represents an indigent state prisoner in
reversed and remanded the case to the district court. Davis was subsequently
ordered released from custody and the state elected not retry him.2 State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 2, 153 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1967) ; this payment
was subsequent to ch. 247 [1917] N.C. SEss. L. as amended by ch. 226
[1937] N.C. SEss. L., allowing the fee of appointed counsel in capital cases
to be determined by the judge and paid by the county where the defendant
was indicted.
3270 N.C. at 4, 153 S.E.2d at 751.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (1965) states in part: "Whenever an attorney
is appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant he shall receive
a fee for performing such service to be fixed by the court which shall be
reasonable and commensurate with the time consumed, the nature of the
case, the amount of fees usually charged for such cases in the county or
locality. .. ."
State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 13, 153 S.E.2d 749, 757 (1967). Neither the
judge below nor the attorneys' brief stated any specific provision of the
North Carolina Constitution which would be violated by the state's refusal
to pay compensation: "[A] person who asserts that a particular act violates
his rights under the Constitution must point out the particular provision of
the Constitution that he claims is violated." Id.
a Id. at 9, 153 S.E.2d at 755. If N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (1965) is read
alone it would appear broad enough to cover the circumstances in the instant
case, but when read in conjunction with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (1965)
its coverage does appear limited to compensation for state proceedings only.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 states in part: "When a defendant charged with
a felony is not represented by counsel. . . . If the judge finds that the
defendant is indigent . . . he shall appoint counsel for the defendant . . ..
In case of an appeal to the supreme court the judge shall appoint counsel
for such appeal or continue the services of the counsel already appointed
" 270 N.C. at 10, 153 S.E.2d at 755.
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subsequent proceedings in the federal courts." On the question of
services rendered within the same judicial system, the weight of
authority in this country and England adheres to the general prin-
ciple that only the legislature can provide for the compensation of
an indigent's court appointed lawyer. Two theories have been
offered in support of this principle, either singly or in conjunction.
First, a lawyer is an officer of the court and as such has special
rights and privileges, a corollary to which is the duty, when called
upon by the court, to defend indigent criminal defendants. One
who accepts the office of attorney does so cum onere, with all the
burdens incident thereto." Second, the obligation to defend indi-
gents without compensation is a condition under which a law yer is
licensed by the state to practice law." The courts have used this
reasoning to reject the claims of attorneys that refusal to compen-
sate them for their work was an unconstitutional deprivation of
property.
A minority of courts has rejected the idea that only the legis-
lature can provide for the payment of court appointed counsel.' 2
Those courts claiming the power to grant compensation despite the
lack of legislative authority have given various reasons: (1) the
8 270 N.C. at 13, 153 S.E.2d at 757. The circumstances presented by
this case probably constitute the only way that the question of compensation
of counsel could occur in North Carolina today. North Carolina provides
for mandatory appointment of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1965), and requires that such counsel
be compensated, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1965).
' Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Dillon, In re Strayer, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966); Weiner v.
Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143 (1966); Warner v.
Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966); In re Mears, 124 Vt. 131, 198
A.2d 27 (1964) ; Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943) ;
All these cases concerned compensation for services rendered in the same
judicial system which denied the compensation.
0Cases cited note 9 supra.
Cases cited note 9 supra.
SDillon v. United States, It re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore.
1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966) ;
People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d. 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966) (the
court stated that it had the power to relieve an intolerable burden on assigned
counsel but the permanent solution was for the legislature) ; Knox County
Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940);
Hyatt v. Hamilton County, 121 Iowa 292, 96 N.W. 885 (1903); State v.
Rush, 46 N.T. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (the court delayed its plan until
January 1, 1967 to give the legislature time to act on the matter) ; County of
Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861). But see Green Lake County v. Wau-
paca County, 113 Wis. 425 (1902). All these cases concerned services ren-
dered to the same judicial system which granted the compensation.
1968i
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court's power to grant compensation for a public taking of private
property;13 (2) the theory of implied contract;4 and (3) authority
incidental to the power of the court to appoint attorneys for indi-
gents.1 5 In allowing the compensation, these courts have rejected
the idea that lawyers are a privileged class and that the defense of
indigents can be made a condition to the state's grant of a license
to practice law.' 6
While it is true that almost all states' 7 and the federal govern-
ment' provide some method of compensating assigned counsel for
trial and appellate work, the area of post-conviction proceedings has
been almost ignored.' 9 Today an attorney, appointed to represent
an indigent defendant, who decides to seek relief in the federal
courts2° from a state or federal conviction, will probably not re-
ceive compensation from any source.
The federal courts have held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel does not apply in a post-conviction proceeding.2 ' The
reason often given is that such proceedings are civil rather than
criminal. 2 However, a failure to appoint counsel may be reversible
1" Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore.
1964), rev'd 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
"'Haytt v. Hamilton County, 121 Iowa 292, 96 N.W. 885 (1903) ; (the
state, by requesting and accepting the services of appointed counsel, implies
a promise to pay the reasonable value thereof).
"Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29
N.E.2d 405 (1940); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
1" Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Ore.
1964); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29
N.E.2d 405 (1940). In Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133
P.2d 325, 327 (1943), the court rejected the idea that defense of indigents
could be made a condition to the granting of a license by the state to practice
law but allowed compensation on the "officer of the court" theory.
1 See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 253-67 (1966) for a sum-
mary of the various state statutes relating to appointment and compensation
of counsel for indigent defendants as of March 1, 1965.
"The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).
" AmERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION
REMEDIES: TENTATIVE DRAFT 65 (1967) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STAN-
DARDS].
20 'Federal post-conviction proceedings' for the purpose of this note mean
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958) (brought by one who seeks
relief in the federal court from a state court conviction), and under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1958) (brought to vacate a federal conviction).
2 Whether or not this rule should be changed is beyond the scope of
this note. For discussions of this rule see: 51 CALIF. L. REV. 970 (1963);
30 U. Cir. L. REv. 583 (1963); and 19 U. MIAmI L. REv. 432 (1965).2 2 E.g., Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1964) (ap-
pointment of counsel is within the discretion of the trial court) ; Huizar v.
United States, 339 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1965).
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error if the circumstances of the particular case show that such
failure resulted in a denial of due process as required by the fifth
amendment. 3 If a substantial issue of fact is alleged in the petition
which would require a hearing in the case of a non-indigent defen-
dant, counsel should be appointed.24
The procedure of appointing counsel to represent an indigent
petitioner for post-conviction relief only after the court has de-
termined that the petition is not frivolous has received some criti-
cism,2 5 but it does have merit. The classification of the relief as
civil rather than criminal is not the real reason for the refusal to
appoint counsel as a matter of right.2" Sounder reasons for the
practice are as follows: (1) these proceedings follow criminal pro-
ceedings where the petitioner has had benefit of counsel at every
step; (2) such proceedings are not part of the guilt determining
process, but follow it; and (3) petitions may be resubmitted and
are often frivolous.2
7
Once the court determines that a petition does have merit and
decides to appoint counsel, he should be compensated.2" The burden
confronting counsel assigned for post-conviction proceedings is
often greater than that faced by counsel assigned at the trial level.29
When a hearing is granted, "it must be a fair one considering all
the circumstances, adequate. . . to allow a meaningful presentation
" Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
" Id.; Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1965); Campbell v.
United States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1963) (a divided court held that Gid-
eon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), required appointment of counsel);
Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958); Green v. United States,
158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass. 1958)
" PRESIDENT'S Comm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUsTIcE, TASK FORcE REPORT: THE CouRTs 47 (1967). This report
recommended the appointment of counsel for petitioners as a matter of
course. See also articles cited note 21 supra.
"' Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States ex reL Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960).
"' Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1962).
"A.B.A. STANDARDS § 4.4(a) (1967): "It is most desirable to avoid
processing of applications for post-conviction relief beyond the initial
screening of the documents without counsel .... When private counsel
are appointed. their services should be compensated adequately from
public funds."
2 REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 45 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as COMMITTEE ON POVERTY]. Some examples of these are: (1) if
there is a factual issue witnesses must be located and their memories may be
poor; (2) often counsel must work from a "cold" record; (3) legal issues
are often complex and require much research; (4) the proceedings can be
protracted (five years in the instant case) ; and many others.
1968]
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of the petitioner's claims."3 Whether failure to compensate attor-
neys for the work they do when appointed to represent an indigent
results in constitutionally inadequate advocacy has yet to be an-
swered. While some data on this question has been collected, it is
insufficient to allow an affirmative answer."1 It is difficult if not
impossible to determine what motivates an attorney to exhaust
every means of relief for his indigent client.82  However, when
assigned counsel has received less than adequate compensation for
his work at trial and on appeal,88 the financial burden of federal
post-conviction relief may be too great.84 Such a situation presents
a serious ethical problem to the lawyer who fears that the diligent
prosecution of his client's rights may seriously affect his earning
capacity.
The Bar alone should not be required to carry the burden of the
costs of post-conviction proceedings. The infrequency of appoint-
ment where it is discretionary may in some ways be attributed to the
reluctance of the court, state or federal, to impose the financial bur-
den of such proceeding on the bar.85 If due process requires coun-
sel to be appointed for the indigent petitioner in the federal court,30
the duty to provide counsel should be that of the federal govern-
ment and not the legal profession. The fifth amendment guarantee
of just compensation was designed to prevent the government from
placing a public burden on a single person or group of persons. 87
When a fair hearing requires representation of the petitioner, coun-
3o 1d.
31 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 17 at 20-27. In one study, defendants with
assigned counsel pleaded guilty more often and received prison sentences
rather than probation more often than defendants with retained counsel.
. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 408, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (1966).
The compensation allowed by the various statutes is often nominal.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) provides a
maximum of 15 dollars per hour for work in court and 10 dollars per
hour for work outside of court, not to exceed 500 dollars for a felony
or 300 dollars for a misdemeanor, with a proviso for payment in excess of
this limit in extraordinary circumstances. Compensation for appeal work
"in no event" is to exceed 500 dollars for a felony and 300 dollars for a mis-
demeanor. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-1 (1966) provides for a maximum of
50 dollars for a felony and 25 dollars for a misdemeanor.
34 Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Ore.
1964) (two young attorneys were forced to borrow money to support them-
selves when a case they were assigned lasted almost six months).3 3A.B.A. STANDARDS 65: United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins,
281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960).
8 Cases cited supra note 24.
* Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Ore.
1964).
[Vol. 46
COMPENSATION OF COUNSEL
sel should be appointed: "Counsel. . . should be permitted to make
as effective a presentation as the merits allow. This requires that
counsel be granted reasonable compensation and. . . expenses prop-
erly incurred." 8
While the majority of jurisdictions place the responsibility of
providing for compensation of appointed counsel on the legisla-
ture,"9 in federal post-conviction proceedings the issue is complicated
by the question of which legislature-state or federal. Compen-
sation of counsel for petitioners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 from federal convictions must be the responsibility of the
federal government. One of the most delicate problems in the
dual system of government is the power of the federal courts to
grant relief to state prisoners by vacating state court convictions.
The issue of compensation of counsel for state prisoners seeking
federal relief merely compounds the problem.
A state could enact a statute which authorized the payment of
attorneys for work done in the federal courts to vacate the convic-
tions of indigent state prisoners, although this appears highly un-
likely. States dislike the use of habeas corpus by the federal courts
to vacate state court convictions. Since the state court has no juris-
diction to appoint counsel for a federal court proceeding, the state
legislatures would be reluctant to appropriate money without any
control over its disbursement.40
It would seem that the best solution is a federal statute that
provides compensation for attorneys appointed in the federal court
to represent indigent petitioners proceeding under either 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (state prisoners) or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (federal prisoners).
Whether the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, is
sufficient for this purpose has not yet been decided.41 The statute
COMMITTEE ON PovERTY 45.
See note 9 supra.
,0 State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 8, 153 S.E.2d 749, 754 (1967). The
attorneys in this case were never appointed by any court to represent Davis
in the federal courts.
"'In In re Hagler, 246 F. Supp. 716 (D. Hawaii 1965), the court held
that compensation could not be paid to counsel appointed to seek post-convic-
tion relief under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. However, the court
treated the action before it as equivalent to a motion pursuant to Rules 12
and 48 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and granted the
counsel compensation; In United States v. Boyden, 248 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.
Cal. 1965) the court allowed compensation under the Criminal Act of
1964 to counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a probation
revocation proceeding, saying that the hearing was an extension of the
criminal proceeding.
1968]
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says that "A defendant... shall be represented at every stage of the
proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States
commissioner through appeal."4  The Attorney General of the
United States said that the statute was "designed to afford repre-
sentation to each defendant throughout his involvement in the judi-
cial process." 4 But the committee which was established to imple-
ment the statute stated that the act was not meant to apply to post-
conviction proceedings.44  Since there is a strong possibility that the
courts will refuse to grant compensation to counsel appointed for
post-conviction purposes under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
Congress should pass legislation specifically addressed to the prob-
lem.
Providing counsel for a prisoner attacking the validity of a
state conviction in the federal courts creates a delicate situation."
It is just this situation which strongly supports the present prac-
tice of not appointing counsel in such proceedings as a matter of
course. It would be most offensive to the states if counsel were
automatically appointed to examine the record for constitutional
defects whenever a petition was filed. Such appointment is not
required" to establish the equality in the administration of criminal
justice which the Supreme Court has sought.47 The proposed stat-
ute should set up guidelines that counsel not be appointed if the pe-
tition is frivolous or if there has been a prior unsuccessful application
where the prisoner was represented by counsel. 48
When appointed counsel's duty to his client terminates with the
final judgment of the court appointing him, there is a gap in repre-
sentation.49 The statute could remedy this by establishing a pro-
cedure whereby a preliminary motion filed with the petition would
'"The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c).
'
3 Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, United States Attorney General, to
President John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1963, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2994-95 (1964).
"' REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AcT OF 1964, 36 F.R.D. 277, 287 (1965)
"COMMITTEE ON POVERTY 45.
"See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
TDouglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 707, (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12(1956); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"A.B.A. STANDARDS 67.
9 Id.
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RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
allow the court to continue the appointment if it determined counsel
was required.50
STEPHEN E. CULBRETHr
Constitutional Law-Effect of the Right to Speedy
Trial on Nolle Prosequi
In Klopfer v. North Carolina,'the United States Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to speedy
trial is a basic right protected by the Constitution and is therefore
incorporated into the due process clause and made obligatory upon
the states under the fourteenth amendment.2 Implicit in the de-
cision is the proposition that the speedy trial guarantee is to be en-
forced against the states according to the federal standard.3
In Klopfer, a violation of the sixth amendment was found in
the use of the North Carolina procedural device of "nolle prosequi
with leave." Its objectionable characteristic is the power given
the state solicitor to suspend indefinitely action on a case, after an
indictment has been filed, and notwithstanding defendant's timely
demand for trial.
Klopfer, a Duke University professor, was tried in March, 1964
on charges of criminal trespass resulting from his participation in
a widespread effort to desegregate stores and eating places in Chapel
Hill in January of that year.' A mistrial was declared when the
jury could not agree and the case was continued. Prior to the next
o Id. It is hoped that this would reduce the number of claims for relief
and all but eliminate the frivolous ones. Counsel should advise the prisoner
of the risks inherent in filing the petition: it endangers eligibility for parole
and if successful the relief is usually limited to a new trial and the danger of
a higher sentence.
87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).
2 E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right
to confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel). These decisions, like the
instant case, are part of a continuing pattern which is apparently directed
towards complete imposition of at least the guarantees of the first eight
amendments upon the states by declaring them to be a part of the fourteenth
amendment. For a discussion of how, if at all, this operation should come
about, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"To be enforced against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
according to the same standards that protect these personal rights against
federal encroachment." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
'See Pollitt, Legal Problens in Southern Desegregation: The Chapel
Hill Story, 43 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1965).
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